We explore the dynamic e¤ects of minimum wage in a Schumpeterian model with endogenous market structure and obtain the following results. First, raising the minimum wage decreases the employment of low-skill workers and increases the unemployment rate. Second, it decreases the level of output. Third, it decreases the transitional growth rate of output but does not a¤ect the steady-state growth rate. Our quantitative analysis shows that the magnitude of the negative e¤ects of minimum wage is sharply increasing in low-skill labor intensity in production and that employed low-skill workers gain initially but might su¤er from slower growth in future wages.
Introduction
In the US, some states have recently passed legislation to raise the minimum wage signi…cantly. For example, California and Massachusetts will raise the minimum wage to $15 per hour by 2023, whereas Illinois will do so by 2025. 1 This study explores the e¤ects of minimum wage on unemployment and economic growth. We incorporate minimum wage into a Schumpeterian model with endogenous market structure and obtain the following results. First, raising the minimum wage decreases the employment of low-skill workers and increases the unemployment rate. Second, it decreases the level of output. Third, it decreases the transitional growth rate of output but does not a¤ect the steady-state growth rate. 2 The intuition of these results can be explained as follows.
A binding minimum wage decreases the demand for low-skill workers and causes their employment level to fall below full employment, which leads to unemployment. Lower employment reduces the level of output. The smaller market size in turn reduces the incentives for innovation and leads to a decrease in the transitional growth rate of output. Over time, the smaller market size causes some …rms to exit the market, and the market size of each …rm gradually returns to the initial level. Given that it is the average …rm size (rather than the aggregate market size) that determines the incentives for innovation, 3 the steady-state growth rate of output also returns to the initial level. Therefore, raising the minimum wage has a temporary sti ‡ing e¤ect on growth, but not a permanent one.
Calibrating our model to US data for a quantitative analysis, we …nd that raising the minimum wage by 1% increases the unemployment rate by at least 0.3% and decreases the growth rate of output by at least 0.1% on impact. Furthermore, the magnitude of these e¤ects is sharply increasing in the intensity of low-skill labor in production. Therefore, a more skill-intensive economy is more immune to the negative e¤ects of minimum wage. Finally, we simulate the path of low-skill wages and …nd that employed low-skill workers gain initially but might su¤er from slower growth in future wages.
This study relates to the literature on innovation and economic growth. The seminal R&D-based growth model developed by Romer (1990) focuses on the invention of new products (i.e., horizontal innovation). The Schumpeterian model developed by Aghion and Howitt (1992) focuses on the quality improvement of products (i.e., vertical innovation). Subsequent studies, such as Smulders and van de Klundert (1995), Peretto (1998 Peretto ( , 1999 and Howitt (1999) , combine the two dimensions of innovation and develop the second-generation Schumpeterian model. 4 This study contributes to the literature by incorporating minimum wage into this vintage of the Schumpeterian model with endogenous market structure to explore its e¤ects on unemployment and innovation. 5 This study also relates to the vast literature on labor markets and economic growth; see 1 The current federal minimum wage in the US is $7.25 per hour. 2 Although empirical studies on minimum wage tend to …nd contrasting e¤ects, these results are consistent with recent studies by Sabia (2014 Sabia ( , 2015 , who …nds that minimum wage reduces low-skill employment and causes a short-run decline in state GDP generated by low-skill industries. 3 Madsen (2010) for evidence that supports the second-generation model. 5 For other approaches of incorporating unemployment into the innovation-driven growth model, see Mortensen and Pissarides (1998) Topel (1999) for a comprehensive survey. Our study relates most closely to studies that explore minimum wage in growth models. Early studies by Cahuc and Michel (1996) , Ravn and Sorensen (1999) and Askenazy (2003) identify interesting mechanisms through which minimum wage has ambiguous e¤ects on growth; see also Tamai (2009) and Fanti and Gori (2011) for more recent studies and a discussion of the subsequent literature. A recent study by Agenor and Lim (2018) develops an ambitious quantitative framework based on the Romer model with horizontal innovation to explore the dynamic e¤ects of minimum wage and also …nds that it increases unemployment and reduces growth. This study complements these previous studies by considering a Schumpeterian model with two dimensions of innovation to analytically derive and quantify the complete transitional e¤ects of minimum wage on growth and showing that endogenous market structure changes its e¤ects at di¤erent time horizons.
A Schumpeterian model with minimum wage
The Schumpeterian model with in-house R&D and endogenous market structure is based on Peretto (2007 Peretto ( , 2011a . We incorporate minimum wage into the Peretto model to explore its e¤ects on unemployment and innovation.
Household
The representative household has the following utility function:
where c t is the household's consumption of …nal good (numeraire) and > 0 determines the rate of subjective discounting. The household maximizes (1) subject to
a t is the value of assets owned by the household. r t is the real interest rate. The household has H + L members. 6 Each of the H members supplies one unit of high-skill labor and earns ! t , which is above the minimum wage and determined as an equilibrium outcome in the high-skill labor market. Each of the L members supplies one unit of low-skill labor. Employed low-skill workers l t earn w t , which is determined by the minimum wage set by the government. Unemployed low-skill workers L l t receive an unemployment bene…t b t < w t . The household pays a lump-sum tax t to the government. From dynamic optimization, the Euler equation is
Final good
Competitive …rms produce …nal good Y t using the following production function:
where N t is the mass of available intermediate goods at time t. The productivity of X t (i) depends on its own quality Z t (i) and also on the average quality Z t 1 Nt . We follow Romer (1990) to assume that the production of …nal good uses both high-skill labor h t and low-skill labor l t with a unitary elasticity of substitution. The term l t h 1 t =N t captures a congestion e¤ect of variety and removes the scale e¤ect in the model. 7 Pro…t maximization yields the following conditional demand functions for fl t ; h t ; X t (i)g:
where
The market-clearing condition for high-skill labor implies h t = H. The minimum wage in the low-skill labor market implies unemployment (i.e., l t < L).
Intermediate goods and in-house R&D
The monopolistic …rm in industry i 2 [0; N t ] uses X t (i) units of …nal good to produce X t (i) units of intermediate good i and incurs Z t (i)Z 1 t units of …nal good as a …xed operating cost. The …rm also invests R t (i) units of …nal good to improve the quality Z t (i) of its product. The in-house R&D process is
In industry i, the pro…t ‡ow (before R&D investment) at time t is
The value of the monopolistic …rm in industry i is
The …rm maximizes (10) subject to (7)- (9) . The current-value Hamiltonian is where t (i) is the co-state variable on (8) . We solve this optimization problem in Appendix A and derive the pro…t-maximizing price p t (i) = 1= > 1.
We follow previous studies to consider a symmetric equilibrium in which Z t (i) = Z t and X t (i) = X t for i 2 [0; N t ]. 8 From (7) and p t (i) = 1= , the quality-adjusted …rm size is
We de…ne the following transformed variable:
which is a state variable. Lemma 1 derives the rate of return on quality-improving R&D, which is increasing in the …rm size x t l t .
Lemma 1
The rate of return to in-house R&D is
Proof. See Appendix A.
Entrants
We follow previous studies to assume that entrants have access to aggregate technology Z t to ensure symmetric equilibrium at any time t. A new …rm incurs X t units of …nal good to set up its operation and enter the market with a new intermediate good.
> 0 is a cost parameter, and the entry cost X t is increasing in the size of initial production. The asset-pricing equation determines the rate of return on assets as
The entry condition is
Substituting (8), (9), (13), (16) and p t (i) = 1= into (15) yields the return on entry as 9
where z t _ Z t =Z t is the growth rate of aggregate quality.
Government
The government sets a minimum wage w t that is binding in the low-skill labor market. We follow previous studies to assume that w t is proportionally higher than the equilibrium wage w t that would have prevailed without the minimum wage; i.e.,
where > 0 is the minimum-wage policy instrument. The government levies a lump-sum tax t on the household to balance the …scal budget t = b t (L l t ).
Equilibrium
We de…ne the equilibrium in Appendix B.
Aggregation
The resource constraint on …nal good is
Substituting (7) and p t (i) = 1= into (4) and imposing symmetry yield the level of output:
Substituting (5) and (20) into (18) yields
which implies
Equation (22) shows that low-skill employment is stationary (i.e., l t = l for all t). Therefore, the growth rate of output is simply determined by the quality growth rate; i.e., _ Y t =Y t = z t . 10 
Dynamics
To analyze the dynamics of the economy, we derive the consumption-output ratio …rst.
Lemma 2
The consumption-output ratio jumps to a unique and stable steady-state value:
Proof. See Appendix A. 10 Parameterizing the congestion e¤ect in (4) as l t h 1
which is nonetheless determined by the rate of return r q t on in-house R&D in (14) as (24) shows.
Lemma 2 implies that consumption and output grow at the same rate given by
where the last equality uses (3) . Substituting (14) and (22) into (24) yields
which is positive if and only if
Intuitively, each …rm's market size needs to be large enough for in-house R&D to be profitable. For the rest of the analysis, we assume that x t > x, which implies z t > 0 and r q t = r t for all t. Lemma 3 derives the dynamics of x t , which in turn determines the number of …rms (i.e., N t = 2=(1 ) H 1 =x t ) in the market.
Lemma 3
The dynamics of x t is determined by an one-dimensional di¤erential equation:
Proposition 1 Under the parameter restriction < min f(1 ) ; (1 ) (1 ) =( )g, the dynamics of x t is globally stable and x t gradually converges to a unique steady-state value. The steady-state values fx ; g g are given by
x (
Proposition 1 shows that given an initial x 0 , the state variable x t gradually converges to its steady-state x . Equation (25) shows that when x t converges to x , the equilibrium growth rate g t also converges to its steady-state g .
Dynamic e¤ects of minimum wage
Equation (22) shows that raising the minimum wage decreases low-skill employment l t and increases the unemployment rate u t given by
for all t. Substituting (22) into (20) yields the equilibrium level of output Y t , which is decreasing in for a given technology level Z t . In other words, raising the minimum wage leads to a contemporaneous drop in output by decreasing employment. Equation (25) shows that the equilibrium growth rate g t is also decreasing in for a given x t . Intuitively, raising the minimum wage decreases employment l t and the …rm size x t l t , which in turn decreases the rate of return to in-house R&D in (14) and the equilibrium growth rate in (25) . However, the lower level of employment reduces the aggregate market size and leads to an exit of …rms, which in turn gives rise to a gradual increase in x t as implied by (27) . When x t reaches the new steady-state x , which is increasing in as shown in (28), the steady-state growth rate returns to the initial level because g in (29) is independent of . Therefore, raising the minimum wage has a temporary sti ‡ing e¤ect on growth, but not a permanent one. Figure  1 illustrates the transitional path of g t when the government raises at time t. Proposition 2 summarizes these results.
Proposition 2 Raising the minimum wage has the following e¤ects: (a) it permanently decreases the employment of low-skill workers, (b) it permanently increases the unemployment rate; (c) it decreases the level of output for a given Z t ; (d) it decreases the transitional growth rate of output but does not a¤ect the steady-state growth rate.
Proof. Proven in text. 
Quantitative analysis
We calibrate the model to simulate the e¤ects of raising by 1%. The model features the following parameters: f ; ; ; ; ; ; ; L=Hg. We set the discount rate to 0.04. We follow Iacopetta et al. (2019) to set the degree of technology spillovers 1 to 0.833. From the estimates in Heathcote et al. (2010) , we consider 2 [0:25; 0:75] as a plausible range for the intensity of low-skill labor. Then, we calibrate f ; ; ; ; L=Hg by matching the following moments in the US. First, labor income share is 60%. Second, the consumption share of output is 64%. Third, the growth rate g t is 2%. Fourth, the unemployment rate u t is 6%. Fifth, the skill premium ! t =w t is 1.40. Table 1 presents the calibrated parameter values and the simulated e¤ects on u t . Figure  2 presents the simulated paths of g t . We …nd that raising the minimum wage by 0.01 increases the unemployment rate u t permanently by at least 0.34% (i.e., from 6% to 6.34%) and decreases the growth rate g t on impact by at least 0.10% (i.e., from 2% to 1.90%). The magnitude of these e¤ects is sharply increasing in because minimum wage a¤ects low-skill labor. Therefore, a more skill-intensive economy (i.e., a smaller ) is more immune to the negative e¤ects of minimum wage. 
Dynamic e¤ects on low-skill wages
Finally, we explore the dynamic e¤ects of on the path of minimum wages:
which uses (20) and (22) . Figure 3 presents the simulated paths of ln w t given by
when increases by 1%. It shows that although employed low-skill workers receive higher wages initially, even these intended bene…ciaries might experience a loss in future wages due to the temporary slow down in growth. 
Conclusion
This study analyzes minimum wage in the Peretto model of Schumpeterian growth. Although our …nding that minimum wage reduces employment and growth is not surprising, it is consistent with recent empirical evidence; see e.g., Sabia (2014 Sabia ( , 2015 . Finally, this study focuses on quality-improving innovation, which determines long-run growth, 11 and leaves the important implications on automation (i.e., labor-saving technologies) to future research. 12 Appendix A Proof of Lemma 1. The current-value Hamiltonian for monopolistic …rm i is given by (11) . Substituting (7)-(9) into (11), we can derive
(A1) yields p t (i) = 1= . Substituting (A2), (13) and p t (i) = 1= into (A3) and imposing symmetry yield (14) .
Proof of Lemma 2. Substituting (16) into the total asset value a t = N t V t yields
where the second equality uses Y t = N t X t = . 13 Di¤erentiating (A4) with respect to t yields
where the second equality uses (2) and t = b t (L l t ). Using (3) for r t , (5) for w t , (6) for ! t and (A4) for a t , we can rearrange (A5) to obtain
which is increasing in c t =a t with a strictly negative y-intercept. Therefore, c t =a t must jump to the steady state. Then, we have (23), noting (A4).
Proof of Lemma 3. Substituting z t = g t = r t = r e t into (17) yields
which also uses _ l t = 0 from (22) . Then, we use the expression of z t in (25) to derive (27) .
Proof of Proposition 1. One can rewrite (27) simply as _ x t = d 1 d 2 x t . This linear system for x t has a unique (non-zero) steady state that is globally (and locally) stable if
from which we obtain < min f(1 ) ; (1 ) (1 ) =( )g. Then, _ x t = 0 yields the steady-state value x = d 1 =d 2 ; which gives (28) . Substituting (28) into (25) yields (29) . 13 We derive this by using p t (i) = 1= and X t (i) = X t for Y t = R Nt 0 p t (i)X t (i)di.
